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"[P]laintiffs do not have a fundamental right to obtain any food they
wish."'
"When did we lose our right to buy whatever food we want directly
from farmers and assorted food producers, outside of the regulatory system
of permits and inspections?"2
1. Br. in Supp. of United States' Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Am. Compl. at 26, Farm-
To-Consumer Legal Def. Fund v. Sebelius, No. 5:10-cv-04018-MWB (N.D. Iowa, filed
Apr. 26, 2010).
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I. THE FOOD MOVEMENT RISES
For millennia, humans either caught or raised their own food or pur-
chased it from local farmers or shopkeepers; however they obtained their
food, they knew where it came from. In fact, obtaining one's food directly
from the farmer who grew it is one of the most traditional economic prac-
tices that there can be. But with the industrial age came industrial food,
which has broken the local food connection between producer and consum-
er.4 For example, two companies now grow 85% of all of the carrots eaten
in the U.S.5 The four largest beef slaughterers have sold between 65% and
70% of all beef consumed nationally since 2000.6 But local food is making
a comeback; locavores look for locally grown or raised food, and other epi-
curean consumers seek organic and naturally produced food.7 These alter-
native food movements are a "challenge to and a denouncement of the cur-
rent industrial food system," which writer Michael Pollan, champion of the
food movement, calls "Big Food."
Pollan explains that the alternative food movement is about many
things, including consumer health, food safety regulation, farmland preser-
vation, and efforts to promote urban agriculture, as well as "community,
identity, pleasure, and, most notably, about carving out a new social and
economic space removed from the influence of big corporations on the one
side and government on the other."9 For Pollan, eating is a political acto
2. DAVID E. GUMPERT, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE PURSUIT OF FOOD RIGHTS: THE
ESCALATING BATTLE OVER WHO DECIDES WHAT WE EAT 5 (2013).
3. Nicholas R. Johnson & A. Bryan Endres, Small Producers, Big Hurdles: Barri-
ers Facing Producers of "Local Foods," 33 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 49, 55
(2012).
4. Id at 50.
5. Mark Bittman, Everyone Eats There, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/magazine /californias-central-valley-land-of-a-
billion-vegetables.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., PACKERS & STOCKYARDS PROGRAM, 2011 P&SP
ANNUAL REPORT: GRAIN INSPECTION, PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ADMINISTRATION 30
(2012), available at http://www.gipsa.usda.gov/Publications/psp/ar/2011 _psp_ annu-
al report.pdf.
7. Jaime Bouvier, The Symbolic Garden: An Intersection of the Food Movement
and the First Amendment, 65 ME. L. REv. 426, 430 (2013).
8. Id.
9. Michael Pollan, The Food Movement, Rising, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, June 10,
2010, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/food-movement-rising
/?pagination=false.
10. MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE'S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR
MEALS 11 (2006).
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and the food movement is a way "to foster new forms of civil society.""
Activists, journalists, and researchers take Pollan's theories even fur-
ther; for them, food choice expresses one's self-identity,12 and the food
movement is a political, communicative, and self-expressive act that is
based in substantial part on consumers' desire to reconnect with food pro-
duction and regain trust in the producers of their food.13
Food movement participants want to demonstrate their support for
local farmers, communicate their positions, pro and con, on food-related
laws and regulations, associate with like-minded people, and advocate
locavorism.14 Their advocacy for small food and against intrusive govern-
mental regulations necessarily questions Big Food, seeks liberty, and cre-
ates social change.'5  But it is not just locavores who have historically
prized small, local farmers. Over a century ago, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court recognized the value of small farmers in a vendor's licensing
appeal. In North Carolina, the court held that public policy favored the
farmer exception because it encouraged "the general raising of live stock
by the small farmer, which will not only be profitable to the individual, but
adds[s] to the aggregate wealth of the community."' 6 This is not just old
law and an old way of thinking; still on the books today are a number of
state and federal statutes that explicitly value the small farmer and the
family farm.' 7
11. POLLAN, supra note 10.
12. Carole A. Bisogni et al., Who We Are and How We Eat: A Qualitative Study of
Identities in Food Choice, 34 J. NUTR. EDUC. & BEHAV., 128, 129 (2002).
13. See generally, e.g., Bouvier, supra note 7, at 430; Marne Coit, Jumping on the
Next Bandwagon: An Overview of the Policy and Legal Aspects of the Local Food
Movement, 4 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 45, 46-50 (2008); Jeffrey R. Follett, Choosing a Food
Future: Diferentiating Among Alternative Food Options, 22 J. AGRIC. & ENvTL.
ETHIcs 31, 33 (2009); Johnson & Endres, supra note 3, at 56-57; Molly Kate Bean,
Consumer Support for Local and Organic Foods in Ohio (2008) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, The Ohio State University) (on file with The Ohio State University).
14. Bouvier, supra note 7, at 431; Follett, supra note 13, at 33; Johnson & Endres,
supra note 3, at 57-58.
15. Follett, supra note 13, at 37, 42.
16. State v. Spaugh, 129 N.C. 564, 567, 40 S.E. 60, 61 (1901).
17. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2266 (2012) ("Congress reaffirms the historical policy of
the United States to foster and encourage the family farm system of agriculture in this
country. Congress believes that the maintenance of the family farm system of agricul-
ture is essential to the social well-being of the Nation"); ALA. CODE § 2-6B-1 (1975);
IOWA CODE § 175.4(10) (2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 1-A (2002 & Supp.
2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-9A-1 (2012)
("[t]he Legislature of the State of South Dakota recognizes the importance of the fami-
ly farm to the economic and moral stability of the state").
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Locavores and other food movement participants do not want food
from far away agribusinesses; they seek to buy their food locally and con-
nect with the farmers who produced the food.18 Buying locally allows
them to meet and speak with those who grew their vegetables and raised
their beef; one can hardly shake hands with someone at Kellogg's cereals
or ask Mr. Dole about how he grew his pineapples.1 9 In contrast, anyone at
a farmers' market can walk up to the farmer and ask, before buying any
food, how he grew his lettuce or how she raised her pigs. Learning about
where their food came from empowers consumers to develop or regain
their connection with their community and with their food, and helps them
recover or even discover a sense of place. 20 Finally, it helps consumers
gain or regain trust in their food's safety and quality. Traditionally, "per-
ceptions of food quality were often the result of personal observation and
social networks in the local community." 2 1 Industrial food made this im-
possible. But when a buyer can see the seller and ask her about her prod-
ucts, the buyer regains trust in his food.22
II. AN ARGUMENT FOR FOOD RIGHTS
This article will explore consumers' rights to purchase meat and
poultry directly from the food's producer without mandatory governmental
inspection. It expands former University of Nevada law student Kammi L.
Rencher's recent proposition that food choice may deserve at least some
23
degree of heightened constitutional protection. Rencher suggested that
health, religious expression, cultural expression, self-expression, and
speech can explain a person's food choice, but did "not attempt to establish
that food choice is a fundamental right." 2 4 I take the next step and demon-
strate that: a) the consumer's desire to purchase and consume meat and
poultry from the farmer who raised the animals, without governmental in-
terference, are indeed statements of self-identity and self-expression and
forms of political speech and political action that are aspects of our consti-
tutionally protected liberty interests; and b) our national customs and prac-
tices of purchasing meat and poultry directly from the farmer who pro-
duced that food, without mandatory governmental inspection, is so deeply
18. Coit, supra note 13, at 48-50.
19. Johnson & Endres, supra note 3, at 92.
20. Id. at 50.
21. Bean, supra note 13, at 62.
22. Johnson & Endres, supra note 3, at 93.
23. Kammi L. Rencher, Note, Food Choice and Fundamental Rights: A Piece of
Cake or Pie in the Sky?, 12 NEV. L.J. 418, 420 (2012).
24. Id.
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rooted in our nation's history and tradition that it should constitute a fun-
damental liberty right guaranteed under the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.2 5
Although health, religious, and cultural expression may indeed be
fundamental rights in the context of food choice, I do not make those ar-
guments here. 26 The Supreme Court accepts as fundamental the rights to
make decisions as to one's health care and the right of bodily integrity, but
has not extended those rights beyond actual illnesses, diseases, or protect-
ing against governmental desires to invade one's bodily integrity.2 7 Ac-
cordingly, analysis of those rights, as well as the rights of religious and cul-
tural expression, which involve a whole new ball of wax, are best explored
in a separate article.
While American food regulation laws date back to the founding of
the colonies and were surprisingly detailed in certain areas, a detailed re-
view of these laws reveals that they were narrow in scope.28 Until the
twentieth century, colonial and state statutes focused on food packing and
exporting, food adulteration, vendor licensing, and weights, measures, and
assizes; food inspection was a secondary aim.2 9 The comprehensive food
safety laws as we know them today are a modern invention. 30 Thus, while
state statutes regulated numerous aspects of the food sale transaction, they
rarely affected consumers' rights to purchase food directly from the farmer,
especially when the transaction occurred on the farm.3 1 Most early state
food inspection statutes applied only to food sold at municipal markets,
food sold in barrels, or food sold to middlemen for resale elsewhere, either
for export or at markets.32 Until well into the twentieth century, farmers
and food producers in most states remained free to sell the products of their
farms directly to consumers without any government regulation. 33
25. It should be noted that Florida State University College of Law Professor Samu-
el R. Wiseman recently argued that food choice is not a fundamental right. While I re-
spectfully disagree with Professor Wiseman, this article is not intended to be a rebuttal
of Professor Wiseman's article. Instead, I will let my analysis of the legal issues speak
for itself. Samuel R. Wiseman, Liberty ofPalate, 65 ME. L. REV. 738 (2013).
26. Rencher, supra note 23, at 425-26, 431-37.
27. Deana Pollard Sacks, Elements of Liberty, 61 SMU. L. REV. 1557, 1580-82
(2008).
28. Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt II, A History of Government Regulation
ofAdulteration and Misbranding ofFood, 39 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 2, 35-44 (1984).
29. Id. at 39, 40.
30. Id. at 41.
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Meat inspection statutes were no different. Before the twentieth
century, almost all state meat inspection statutes applied only to cured meat
packaged in barrels for export. 34 Some statutes required inspection of all
meats packaged in barrels, whether for export or not.3 5 Others set up vol-
untary inspection procedures on the theory that inspected and certified food
would be more valuable in the marketplace than uninspected food. 36 Still
other states required farmers to keep the hide of cattle that they slaughtered
for market, but only a few states required mandatory inspections prior to
the sale of food products such as beef and pork.3 7 Even in the modem meat
inspection era in the twentieth century, eighteen states had at one time or
another explicitly excluded from otherwise all-encompassing inspection
statutes meat slaughtered by the farmers who raised the animals or meat
slaughtered in rural districts, where an inspector could not conveniently ac-
cess the meat. The significance of this number is illustrated by the fact that
only twenty-eight states even required inspection of all meat sold intrastate
as late as 1967.38 In fact, farm slaughtered exemption statutes were on the
books of twelve states until the federal Wholesome Meat Act of 1967 man-
dated federal or state inspection of all meat slaughtered for sale for the first
time. Poultry was even less regulated. 3 9 No state required inspection of
poultry products prior to sale until well into the twentieth century. 40 The
federal government required no poultry inspection until 1957.41
This article lays out my argument step by step. Section III will re-
view the law of substantive due process, with emphasis on defining a fun-
damental right and attempting to make a claim for a new, as yet undeclared,
fundamental right. Section IV defines my proposed right in a way that
should meet the Supreme Court's restrictive specifications. Section V
shows that the right to purchase meat and poultry from the farmer who
raised the animals is deeply rooted in our national tradition. Section VI ex-
plains our constitutionally protected liberty rights and demonstrates that
courts should consider food choice to be an aspect of liberty. Finally, Sec-
tion VII provides a brief conclusion.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. FEDERAL MEAT INSPECTION ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 90-653, at 4 (1967).
37. See infra Section V.B.
38. Id.
39. See infra Section V.E.
40. GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 98 (1963).
41. WHOLESOME POULTRY PRODUCTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 90-1333, at 4 (1968).
2013] 179
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: How TO DEFINE A FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT
Substantive due process claims arise under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.42 The Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause applies to the federal government, and the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause applies to state and local governments.43 Substantive
due process claims address whether the government's claimed deprivation
of a person's life, liberty (including the right to privacy)," or property is
justified by a sufficient purpose. 45 In order to determine whether the gov-
ernment's deprivation of one's life, liberty, or property is justified by a suf-
ficient purpose, "one must first determine what kind of means-end scrutiny
applies and, second, whether the deprivation is justified under that test.'A6
If the deprivation infringes a fundamental right, the strict scrutiny test ap-
plies. If the deprivation infringes a non-fundamental right, the rational re-
view test applies. 47  Under the strict scrutiny test, the government must
prove that the infringement is necessary to further a compelling govern-
mental interest. Under the rational review test, the citizen "normally has
the burden of proving that the deprivation is not a rational means for fur-
thering any valid government interest."
Because the strict scrutiny test is far more favorable to the litigant
objecting to governmental action (it has been described as "fatal" to the
government's case),49 plaintiffs in constitutional rights litigation naturally
seek to show that the right at issue is a fundamental right, which would re-
42. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause states that "[n]o person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend.
V. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause states that "[n]o state shall ... de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
43. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L.
REV. 625, 625 n. 1 (1992).
44. Jacobson v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 558 F.2d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 1977);
Aznavorian v. Califano, 440 F.Supp. 788, 799 n. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (citing Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); Providence Journal Co. v. Fed. Bureau of Investiga-
tion, 460 F.Supp. 762, 771 n. 27 (D.R.I. 1978); United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d
293, 304-305, n. 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
578 (2003).
45. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURo L. REv. 1501, 1501
(1999).
46. Galloway, supra note 43, at 627.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 627-28.
49. Lawrence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057, 1057 (1990).
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quire application of the strict scrutiny test. The critical issue in substantive
due process claims is thus how to define a fundamental right.
The Supreme Court has employed two approaches for addressing
fundamental rights claims.o The first approach evaluates the claimed right
on the basis of "personal dignity and autonomy," 5 which is also called the
theory of "reasoned judgment." 52 Under this approach, "the Court itself
evaluates the liberty interest of the individual and weighs it against compet-
ing governmental concerns, determining on this basis whether the liberty
interest deserves protection as a constitutional right."53 The Court used this
approach most notably in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey, an abortion case, in which it proclaimed, "[n]either the Bill of
Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of
liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects." 5 4 Casey held that "ad-
judication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in in-
terpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition
courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment."5 5 The Court has most
recently approved of Casey in the 2003 gay rights case of Lawrence v. Tex-
as.56
The second, more restrictive, approach looks to the "[n]ation's his-
tory and legal tradition."5  The Court notably employed this approach in
the 1934 case of Snyder v. Massachusetts, which held that "[t]he Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts is free to regulate the procedure of its courts
in accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness unless, in so
doing, it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
50. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. C. Von Eschen-
bach, M.D., 445 F.3d 470, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
51. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 445 F.3d at 476
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
52. Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV.
63, 66-67 (2006).
53. Id.
54. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
55. Id. at 849.
56. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Conkle, supra note 52, at 67.
57. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. C. Von Eschen-
bach, M.D., 445 F.3d 470, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721 (1997)), rev'den banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). It should also be
noted that the reasoned judgment approach also considers history and tradition. The
Court in Roe v. Wade used this approach, and "spent a substantial portion of its opinion
exploring tradition." Gregory C. Cook, Note, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia's Attempt to
Impose a Rule of Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 853,
862 n. 56 (1991).
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conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."ss The Court best
explained the history and tradition approach in the 1997 right to die case,
Washington v. Glucksberg, which intoned, "[w]e begin, as we do in all due
process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and prac-
tices" in order to determine whether the "asserted right has any place in our
Nation's traditions."59 In order to prove that a supposed right has a place in
American history and traditions, a plaintiff must: a) provide "a careful de-
scription of the asserted fundamental liberty interest;" and b) show that the
alleged fundamental right is "objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such
that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed." 6 0
While the Court has been traditionally "reluctant to expand the con-
cept of substantive due process,"6' Glucksberg did leave the door open for
new fundamental rights claims by acknowledging that the "outlines" of the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment have never been "fully
clarified" and that they may never be "capable of being fully clarified." 62
The Court has therefore left constitutional rights advocates with the
problem of two independent, incompatible approaches to substantive due
process claims. However, because Lawrence interpreted Casey as applying
strictly to "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, child rearing, and education," the cautious food
rights advocate may not want to advocate the Casey approach for rights
other than those specifically identified in Casey.6 3  Consequently, the
soundest, most practical solution is to employ the test that allows for the
broadest definition of a fundamental right, but also defines the right in the
way that has the lowest chance of being overruled at the appellate level.
Practically, this means following Glucksberg; for the past decade and a
half, the lower courts have been "overwhelmingly relying on Glucksberg
and ignoring Lawrence."64 While the Casey "reasoned judgment" approach
58. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
59. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 720-21 (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
61. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
62. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
63. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003) (citing Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see also URI Student Senate v. Town Of
Narragansett, 707 F.Supp.2d 282, 291 (D.R.I. 2010), aff'd, 631 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011)
(stating that the types of choices that are "central to [Casey's] personal dignity and au-
tonomy" are "personal decisions" that relate to "marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education") (citation omitted).
64. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. C. Von Eschen-
bach, M.D., 445 F.3d 470, 476 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that other circuits have ei-
ther treated the Glucksberg analysis as controlling after Lawrence or viewed Lawrence
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is certainly more open to new fundamental rights claims than Glucksberg,
it is a red herring. As will be shown in Section V, infra, the consumer's
right to purchase meat and poultry directly from the farmer who raised the
animals is indeed deeply rooted in American history and tradition and so
fits quite easily into the Glucksberg pigeonhole.
A. Creating a Careful Description
The food rights advocate's first problem under Glucksberg is to
provide a "careful description" of the alleged fundamental right. But what
is a "careful description?" Unfortunately, the Court "has not settled on
how precisely formulated the right must be."65 Glucksberg did not define
"careful description," instructing only that the proposed right be "carefully
refined by concrete examples involving fundamental rights found to be
deeply rooted in our legal tradition." 6 6 Nor has the Court offered much ad-
ditional guidance. At the most restrictive end of the continuum, Justice
Scalia argued in a footnote to his plurality opinion in an earlier case, Mi-
chael H. v. Gerald D., that the claimed right should be defined at "the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection
to, the asserted right can be identified."6 7 However, this footnote, which
was joined by only one other Justice, Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of
Glucksberg, was immediately controversial. Justices O'Connor and Ken-
nedy, who later authored Casey's plurality opinion, concurred in the opin-
ion, but rejected the footnote, contending that:
[t]his footnote sketches a mode of historical analysis to be
used when identifying liberty interests protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that
may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in
this area . . . On occasion, the Court has characterized rele-
vant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of gener-
ality that might not be "the most specific level" available.68
as not, properly speaking, a substantive due process decision) (citations and punctua-
tion omitted); Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart,
106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1527 (2008) (citing Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg
Renaissance: Substantive Due Process Since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REV.
409,411 (2006)).
65. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs, 445 F.3d at 477.
66. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
67. Michael H v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989).
68. Id. at 132.
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Three years later, they reiterated their disapproval in Casey.69 More recent-
ly, a 2003 case reaffirmed only that "vague generalities, such as 'the right
not to be talked to [in a Fifth Amendment case],' will not suffice."70 This
dispute is not just an ivory tower argument; it has practical implications for
the food rights advocate. As Tribe and Dorf succinctly stated, "[t]he more
abstractly one states the already-protected right, the more likely it becomes
that the claimed right will fall within its protection."7 1
The lower courts have been slightly more instructive. The Seventh
Circuit termed a "careful description" as "one that is specific and concrete,
one that avoids sweeping abstractions and generalities." 72 The court's duty
is to "carefully define the contested right, employing sufficient specificity
to ground the right in a concrete application and sufficient generality to
connect the right to its animating principles." 7 3 The Eleventh Circuit ad-
vised that grounding the right in a concrete application means that the
claimed right "be dictated 'by the precise facts' of the immediate case."74
The District of Columbia Circuit views the careful description requirement
''as a means of constraining the inadvertent creation of rights that could fall
within the scope of loosely worded descriptions and thus threaten the sepa-
ration of powers."75
While definitions are helpful, examples are even better. In a school
immunization case, the court noted that "whether a parent has a fundamen-
tal right to decide whether her child should undergo a medical procedure
76
such as immunization," was a right too broadly claimed. The court
reformatted the "careful description" by stating that, "the question present-
ed by the facts of this case is whether the special protection of the Due Pro-
cess Clause includes a parent's right to refuse to have her child immunized
before attending public or private school where immunization is a precon-
dition to attending school."7 7 Another example comes from a convicted sex
69. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
70. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 776 (2003).
71. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990).
72. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 769 (7th Cir. 2004).
73. Id. (quoting Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (Rogers, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11 th Cir. 2004).
75. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. C. Von Eschen-
bach, M.D., 445 F.3d 470, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Williams, 378 F.3d at 1240
(noting that "the requirement of a 'careful description' is designed to prevent the re-
viewing court from venturing into vaster constitutional vistas than are called for by the
facts of the case at hand").
76. Boone v. Boozman, 217 F.Supp.2d 938, 956 (E.D. Ark. 2002).
77. Id.
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offender's appeal of his banishment from public parks in his city. A "gen-
eralized right to movement" was too broad; more careful was "a right to en-
ter the parks to loiter or for other innocent purposes." 7 8 A more restrictive
example comes from a municipal employment rights case stemming out of
a policewoman's affair with another police officer, where the Tenth Circuit
rejected "a right to private sexual activity" in favor of the right to engage in
"off-duty [sexual] conduct with a fellow officer at a training conference
paid for in part and supported by the department." 79 Finally, Glucksberg
itself provided an excellent example. The Supreme Court rejected the
Court of Appeals' "liberty interest in determining the time and manner of
one's death" in favor of a more specific "right to commit suicide which it-
self includes a right to assistance in doing so."80
Boone, Doe, and Glucksberg all illustrate how a reasonably narrow
- but not too narrow - right can be constructed out of the facts of the case.
In contrast, Seegmiller dictates the opposite conclusion. Such a constricted
"right" is impossible to defend or substantiate, and in fact the Tenth Circuit
quickly found that the petitioner failed to show that this "right" is deeply
rooted in American history and tradition.81
B. Proving a Deeply Rooted Tradition
The second Glucksberg factor requires proof that the right in ques-
tion is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." 82 The nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices include not just American legal traditions, but also the American
philosophical and cultural heritages. 8 3 Courts have, on occasion, reviewed
our nation's history, traditions, and practices extensively. For example,
Glucksberg analyzed seven hundred years of Anglo-American history on
suicide and assisting suicide going back to the thirteenth century.84 Just a
few years ago, in the Second Amendment case of McDonald v. City of Chi-
cago, the Supreme Court examined the Anglo-American historical and le-
gal traditions of gun rights and usage dating back to the seventeenth centu-
ry. In Abigail Alliance II, a drug regulation case, the District of Columbia
78. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 769 (7th Cir. 2004).
79. Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 770 (10th Cir. 2008).
80. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722-23 (1997).
81. Seegmiller, 528 F.3d at 770.
82. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711.
83. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711.
84. Id. at 711-719.
85. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3036-42 (2010).
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Circuit explored the Anglo-American tradition of drug regulation going
back to the fifteenth century.8 6
However, too much historical evidence or unrelated historical evi-
dence is as bad as not enough historical evidence. For example, in Wil-
liams, a case involving the right to sell sexual devices, the Eleventh Circuit
criticized the district judge for too much historical analysis as a result of
defining the right too broadly. The district judge's first problem was defin-
ing the question too broadly, as a "fundamental right to sexual privacy,"87
which the Court of Appeals rejected, instead defining the right as a right to
use sexual devices.88 This overbroad description led directly into the dis-
trict judge's second problem, too much history. The district judge provided
a sixteen page study of American sexual practices and laws from colonial
times to the present day,89 which the Court of Appeals dismissed as an "ir-
relevant exploration of the history of sex in America."90 The Court of Ap-
peals held that the "inquiry should have been focused not broadly on the
vast topic of sex in American cultural and legal history, but narrowly and
more precisely on the treatment of sexual devices within that history and
tradition."91 Williams' message is that the historical analysis in a funda-
mental rights question should match up perfectly with the definition of the
right. The parties and the court should only analyze the American history
and traditions that directly support the carefully described right in question.
C. The Problem of Traditionally Unregulated Rights
A challenge in discerning our national history and traditions in-
volves the distinction, if any, between a right that has been traditionally
protected and one that has been merely "traditionally unregulated."92 Tra
ditionally protecting a right means that the government has affirmatively
acted to protect the right. A traditionally unregulated action is the opposite;
the government has neither protected, nor prohibited, the action. Thus,
showing "a lack of government interference throughout history" with citi-
86. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. C. Von Eschen-
bach, M.D., 495 F.3d 695, 703-05 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Nordyke v. King, 563
F.3d 439, 451 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that "[w]e must trace this right, as thus described,
through our history from the Founding until the enactment of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment").
87. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1277 (N.D. Ala. 2002), rev'd sub nom.
Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
88. Williams, 378 F.3d at 1242.
89. Williams v. Pryor, 220 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1277-1294 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
90. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2004).
91. 1d. at 1243.
92. Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1489 (2008).
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zens' assertion of a right is "some evidence" that the right is "deeply root-
ed," but, for two Courts of Appeals, was not itself enough proof.9 3 In Abi-
gail Alliance II, the District of Columbia Circuit recently pointed out that:
[a] prior lack of regulation suggests that we must exercise
care in evaluating the untested assertion of a constitutional
right to be free from new regulation. But the lack of prior
governmental regulation of an activity tells us little about
whether the activity merits constitutional protection: "The
fact that powers long have been unexercised well may call
for close scrutiny as to whether they exist; but if granted,
they are not lost by being allowed to lie dormant, any more
than nonexistent powers can be prescripted by an unchal-
lenged exercise."94
Indeed, creating constitutional rights to be free from regulation based solely
upon a prior lack of regulation would undermine much of the modem ad-
ministrative state, which, like drug regulation, has increased in scope as
changing conditions have warranted.
In Williams, the Eleventh Circuit criticized the district court for ac-
cepting as a deeply rooted tradition what the Eleventh Circuit considered to
be traditionally unregulated actions. "[R]ather than look for a history and
tradition of protection of the asserted right, the district court [wrongly]
asked whether there was a history and tradition of state non-interference
with the right." 95 For the Court of Appeals, the district court's key find-
ings, "the relative scarcity of statutes explicitly banning sexual devices and
the rarity of reported cases of sexual-devices prosecutions . . . essentially
inverted Glucksberg's history and tradition inquiry." 96 Instead of showing
"that the right to use sexual devices is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's histo-
ry and tradition,' [the district court] looked for a showing that proscriptions
against sexual devices are deeply rooted in history and tradition."9 7 How-
ever, one Eleventh Circuit judge has powerfully argued, albeit in dissent,
that the argument that "the panel misreads Glucksburg to say the only rele-
vant historical inquiry is whether there has been a tradition of laws affirma-
93. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. C. Von Eschen-
bach, M.D., 495 F.3d 695, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
94. Id. at 707 (quoting U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647 (1950)).
95. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in
original).
96. Id. at 1244.
97. Id.
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tively protecting the conduct at issue."98 That judge, Judge Rosemary Bar-
kett, argued that the Eleventh Circuit panel "made up" that requirement,
which was "entirely unsupported by any Supreme Court case," and that, if
"the Supreme Court required affirmative governmental protection of an as-
serted liberty interest, all of the Court's privacy cases would have been de-
cided differently."99
An analogous way to view this issue is through federal preemption
law. In Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,'00 a personal injury case involving
faulty truck brakes, the Supreme Court held that federal highway safety
laws did not preempt state trucking regulations and thus permitted the
plaintiffs' suit to proceed.10' A federal law, the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act, expressly preempted state law whenever a Federal mo-
tor vehicle safety standard was in effect.10 2 The predecessor to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) had issued regulations
concerning truck brakes, known as Standard 121, but a Court of Appeals
suspended the standard because it "was neither reasonable nor practica-
ble."o 3 The NHTSA amended Standard 121, but never took final action to
reinstate the standard, and thus it remained suspended.1 0 4 Despite the fact
that Standard 121 was suspended, Freightliner argued that "the absence of
regulation itself constitutes regulation." 0 5 The Court rejected that conten-
tion, holding that "the lack of federal regulation did not result from an af-
firmative decision of agency officials to refrain from regulating air
brakes." 06 The Court justified its conclusion by noting that the NHTSA
did not affirmatively decide anything. "Rather, the lack of a federal stand-
ard stemmed from the decision of a federal court that the agency had not
compiled sufficient evidence to justify its regulations."' 07
The logic of Abigail Alliance, Williams, and Freightliner places no
roadblocks in the food advocate's way. If legislative "affirmative action"
is the difference between a traditionally protected and a traditionally un-
98. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1308
(1 Ith Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en bane).
99. Id. at 1309; see also id. at 1309 n.49 (noting that "there was no lengthy tradition
of protecting abortion and the use of contraceptives, yet both were found to be protect-
ed by a right to privacy under the Due Process Clause").
100. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 284 (1995).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 284.
103. Id. at 285 (quoting Paccar, Inc. v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632, 640 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978)).
104. Id. at 286.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 286.
107. Id. at 286-287.
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regulated right, review of state and federal legislative action with respect to
farm slaughtered meat and poultry shows that state legislatures and Con-
gress have acted affirmatively for hundreds of years to protect farm to con-
sumer transactions. os As will be shown in Section V, infra, the American
colonies and states had a long tradition of regulating food safety dating
back to 1641.109 For centuries, states regulated many different aspects of
food sales, but always carefully left farm to consumer transactions alone." 0
Such carefully considered inaction was clearly an affirmative decision to
not regulate farm to consumer transactions. Even when states began re-
quiring meat inspection at the turn of the twentieth century, they often left
farm to consumer transactions unregulated.'" And, when Congress began
regulating food safety in the late nineteenth century, it followed suit and
also left farm to consumer transactions unregulated until as late as 1967,
only forty-seven years ago. 12 Thus, for the vast majority of our nation's
history, our government has studiously avoided regulating farm to consum-
er meat and poultry sales even though it regulated many other aspects of
food safety."3
IV. DEFINING THE PROPOSED RIGHT CAREFULLY
Defined broadly, we are talking about the individual's right to pur-
chase and consume food of her choice. While that argument may work in
philosophy, it is too broad for constitutional law, and especially for consti-
tutional law as marked by Glucksberg. Because the right to food choice
must be defined very narrowly in order to satisfy Glucksberg, a right to
purchase and consume food of one's choice is far too sweeping and gen-
eral.11 4 More to the point is an individual's right to purchase food of her
choice directly from the producer or grower of that food. But even that is
too broad for Glucksberg; the category of "food" includes many different
types of food, all of which are grown or produced in different ways and so
108. See infra Sections V.C & V.E.
109. Hutt & Hutt, supra note 28, at 35.
110. Gary D. Libecap, The Rise of the Chicago Packers and the Origins of Meat In-
spection and Antitrust, 30 EcoN. INQUIRY 242, 252 (1992).
111. See infra Section V.B.
112. Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967).
113. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997) (stating that "[i]f a thing
has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case
for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it") (quoting Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260
U.S. 22, 31 (1922)); see also id.; Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664,
678 (1970) (an "unbroken practice ... openly and by affirmative state action, not cov-
ertly or by state inaction, is not something to be lightly cast aside").
114. See generally, e.g., Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 769 (7th Cir. 2004).
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have different means of preparation for sale and different safety concerns.
In order to keep the right as narrow as possible, the right to purchase food
should be limited to food that is grown or produced similarly. Meat and
poultry are more similar than vegetables. Meat and poultry are live animals
that must be raised, slaughtered, and then kept cold so that they do not
spoil. Vegetables certainly have safety issues, but at the very least, they do
not need to be slaughtered, and some vegetables do not need to be kept cold
to avoid spoilage. For this reason, the consumer's right to purchase vege-
tables of her choice directly from the farmer should be treated separately.
A second issue is that, because we are concerned with purchasing
food free from governmental interference, the proposed right must include
that limitation. Finally, because we are also talking about farm slaughtered
meat and poultry, that qualification must also be included in the proposed
right.
Thus, the narrowest and most reasonable definition of our proposed
right that is based on the Nation's historical traditions is an individual's
right to purchase meat and poultry directly from the person who raised and
participated in the slaughtering of that meat or poultry without mandatory
governmental inspection. Such a restricted, focused definition satisfies
Glucksberg's requirement that one must "exercise the utmost care whenev-
er [breaking] new ground" in substantive due process litigation,' 15 as well
as the requirement that the careful description be dictated by the precise
facts of the case.'16
V. THE RIGHT TO PURCHASE MEAT AND POULTRY DIRECTLY FROM
THE FARMERS WHO RAISED THE ANIMALS, WITHOUT GOVERNMENTAL
INSPECTION, IS DEEPLY ROOTED IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND TRADITION
The federal government and a majority of the states have traditional-
ly preserved the consumer's right to purchase meat and poultry from the
farmer without government inspection throughout the vast majority of
American history." 7 From the Pilgrims' landing at Plymouth Rock in 1620
until 1897, almost three centuries later, no American colony or state had
ever legally required mandatory inspection of meat or poultry sold by a
farmer on the farm directly to the consumer." 8 By 1907, only four states
had such requirements for meat."l9 As late as 1967, only twenty-eight
115. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720.
116. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004).
117. See infra Sections V.B & V.C.
118. See infra Section V.B.
119. 1905 Ariz. Sess. Laws 65, 89 (codified as REV. CODE ARIZ. § 3739 (1913));
REV. LAWS MASS. ch. 75, § 105 (1901)); 1897 Okla. Sess. Laws 237, 246 (codified as
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states had passed laws requiring such inspections, and eleven of those
states specifically exempted farm slaughtered meat from mandatory inspec-
tion.12 0 Thus, only forty-five years ago, a majority of states still had no
laws requiring inspection of farm slaughtered meat. Nor did the federal
government enact any such requirements until Congress passed the Whole-
some Meat Act in 1967, 191 years after the Revolution.121
Laws requiring inspection of poultry were even fewer and further
between. Congress passed no national poultry inspection law until 1957.122
By 1968, when Congress passed the more comprehensive Wholesome
Poultry Products Act,123 only twelve states had mandatory poultry inspec-
tion laws, and only four of those had active inspection programs.124
Analysis of state meat inspection laws shows that there can be no
question that the right to purchase meat and poultry directly from the
farmer is deeply rooted in American history and tradition. American histo-
ry includes centuries of direct farm to consumer purchases of meat and
poultry without governmental inspection. American legal traditions in-
clude acknowledging the value of the local farm and ensuring the continua-
tion of farm to consumer purchases of meat and poultry without govern-
mental inspection. 125
A. A BriefHistory of the Meat Trade: From the Local Farmer to the
National Meatpacking Industry
1. The Beginnings
From the earliest days of the American colonies until after the Civil
War, consumers slaughtered their own meat or purchased it locally, either
directly from the farmer or from a local butcher.12 6 The slaughtered meat
REV. STAT. OKLA. ch. 3, (37) §19 (1903)); 1907 Utah Laws 223 (codified as COMP.
LAWS UTAH §1990 (1917)).
120. FEDERAL MEAT INSPECTION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 90-653, at 4 (1967).
121. Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967).
122. Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957) (codi-
fied as 21 U.S.C. § 451 (1958)).
123. Id.
124. Id.; see also WHOLESOME POULTRY PRODUCTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 90-1333, at 4
(1968).
125. See generally State v. Spaugh, 129 N.C. 564, 567, 40 S.E. 60, 61 (1901); Follett,
supra note 13 at 37, 42.
126. See generally, e.g., RUDOLF A. CLEMEN, THE AMERICAN LIVESTOCK AND MEAT
INDUSTRY 3 (1966); GARY FIELDS, TERRITORIES OF PROFIT: COMMUNICATIONS,
CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT, AND THE INNOVATIVE ENTERPRISES OF G.F. SWIFT AND
DELL COMPUTER 92 (2004); George K. Holmes, The First American Farmers, in THE
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trade in those days was so rudimentary as to not even be considered a for-
mal industry. 12 7 As historian Charles W. McCurdy wrote, "[w]hen fresh
meat was available, consumers knew it had been slaughtered nearby." 2 8
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, slaughtered beef remained a
local product, regardless of how it was slaughtered; it rarely traveled more
than fifteen miles to its ultimate destination.129
Cattle and hogs grazed all spring and summer, and were slaughtered
in the fall.130 Livestock could only be slaughtered in the fall because the
flesh was not suitable for butchering in the spring, and, in the summer,
warm temperatures created a high risk of the meat spoiling before it was
cured.' 3' Because fresh meat did not last long, farmers would it eat it
quickly, share it with their neighbors, sell it locally for immediate con-
sumption, or cure and pack it for storage and sale.13 2 Once the slaughtering
season ended, there would be no more fresh meat until the next fall, and
families ate cured, packed meat or no meat at all. Prior the development of
refrigeration in the early 1870's, the only way to store beef was to cure it
and pack it in barrels.133 The packed beef would be sold locally or export-
ed, either to other colonies or abroad.134
2. The Modern Meat Industry Changes the Way Americans Purchase Meat
The modem, industrial food era began in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. New food products and technologies appeared, which al-
lowed items such as baking powder, oleomargarine, canned foods, and
MAKING OF AMERICA (Robert M. La Follette ed. 1907); Joanne Bowen, To Market, to
Market: Animal Husbandry in New England, 32 HIST. ARCHAEOLOGY 137, 141 (1998);
Karen J. Friedmann, Victualling Colonial Boston, 47 AGRIC. HIST. 189, 197-204
(1973); Elmer R. Kiehl & V. James Rhodes, Historical Development of Beef Quality
and Grading Standards 728 U. Mo. C. AGRIC. RES. BULL. 1, 10-11 (1960). Sarah F.
McMahon, A Comfortable Subsistence: The Changing Composition of Diet in Rural
New England, 1620-1840, 42 WM. & MARY Q. 26, 34-37 (1985).
127. FIELDS, supra note 126, at 96.
128. Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large
Corporation, 1875- 1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 643 (1978).
129. FIELDS, supra note 126, at 96.
130. Id.; SUSANNE FREIDBERG, FRESH: A PERISHABLE HISTORY 53 (2009); McMahon,
supra note 126, at 36.
131. McMahon, supra note 126, at 36.
132. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 25, 92; FREIDBERG, supra note 130, at 53; McMah-
on, supra note 126, at 35.
133. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 8; McMahon, supra note 126, at 34-35.
134. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 3.
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chemical preservatives to be shipped from afar without fear of spoilage.'35
The nation underwent wrenching changes that affected the food industry
and food safety. As a result of the Civil War, the country began to indus-
trialize and urbanize.1 3 6 The new national railroad network allowed more
food to be transported into the growing cities. 137 The railroads, as well as
the development of new lands in the West, where livestock could be pas-
tured, and the invention of the refrigerated boxcar, allowed a national beef
industry to develop and thrive in the 1870's.'" For the first time, ranchers
and meatpackers could ship live cattle and dressed meat long distances.
Unfortunately, these developments came with a dark side; the large Mid-
western meatpackersl 39 centered in Chicago now had the power, which they
used collusively to destroy the traditional, local meat trade.140
The newly industrializing and urbanizing cities became overcrowd-
ed, increasing the spread of disease, 14 1 and ultimately leading to federal
food regulation.14 2 The increased urbanization also damaged the relation-
ship between the consumer and the food producer; consumers were now
increasingly buying products about which they knew little.14 3 With the loss
of the consumer's relationship with the food producer came a loss of trust.
This new dependence on impersonal markets "eroded consumers' tradi-
tional methods of identifying quality food, beverage, and drug products,"
which was the connection with the local producer or seller.14 4 But even in-
135. Dennis R. Johnson, The History of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act and the
Meat Inspection Act, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 5, 6 (1982); Marc T. Law, The Origins
of State Pure Food Regulation, 63 J. EcON. HIST. 1103, 1105 (2003) [hereinafter Law,
Origins]; MARC T. LAW, HISTORY OF FOOD AND DRUG REGULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/history-of-food-and-drug-regulation-in-the-united-
states/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Law, History].
136. Johnson, supra note 135, at 5.
137. FIELDS, supra note 126, at 98; Peyton Ferrier & Russell Lamb, Government
Regulation and Quality in the U.S. Beef Market, 32 FOOD POL'Y 84, 87 (2007); John-
son, supra note 135, at 5.
138. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 6; Ferrier & Lamb, supra note 137, at 86.
139. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 3 (noting that the term "packing" originally meant
to cure and smoke meat for local use during the winter).
140. Id. at 173, 225; FIELDS, supra note 126, at 92, 95; Ferrier & Lamb, supra note
137, at 87; McCurdy, supra note 128, at 643.
141. Johnson, supra note 135, at 6.
142. Ilyse D. Barkan, Industry Invites Regulation: The Passage of the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906, 75 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 18, 21-22 (1985).
143. Id. at 20; Johnson, supra note 135, at 6; Law, Origins, supra note 135, at 1105;
Law, History, supra note 135.
144. Barkan, supra note 142, at 20.
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to the twentieth century, farmers continued to sell slaughtered animals di-
rectly to the consumer.145
B. Meat Inspection Under Colonial and State Law
1. The Earliest Days
Much has been written about the ubiquity of colonial and state food
regulations prior to the modem, federal food regulation era,14 6 but the earli-
est colonial food safety laws were "largely designed to protect colonial
trade."l 47 Dating back to 1641,148 these laws focused on inspection of ex-
ports, food adulteration, and weights and measures. 149 Just about every
colony and state regulated food to some degree.150 Nevertheless, despite
the occasional food adulteration law, in those days, as one historian put it,
consumers "were their own food and drug inspectors."151 After the Revolu-
tion, the majority of early state food safety laws continued to focus on the
export trade,15 2 requiring that the merchant submit the product for inspec-
tion and repacking before export.153
145. Louis D. HALL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MEAT SITUATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, PART V, METHODS AND COST OF MARKETING LIVE STOCK AND MEATS 5, 8, 60
(1916), available at https://ia601809.us.archive.org/26/items/meats ituationi-
nul l unit 2/meatsituationinul l unit 2.pdf.
146. See, e.g., ALBERT A. GIESECKE, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION BEFORE
1789 74-80 (1910); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 84-112 (1996); Hutt & Hutt, supra note 28, at 35-
44; Wallace F. Janssen, America's First Food and Drug Laws, 30 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 665, 666-69 (1975); Arthur L. Jensen, The Inspection of Exports in Colonial Penn-
sylvania, 78 PENN. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 275, 276-77 (1954); Law, Origins, supra
note 135, at 1103.
147. Hutt & Hutt, supra note 28, at 38.
148. Id. at 35.
149. GIESECKE, supra note 146, at 75; Hutt & Hutt, supra note 28, at 38-39; Janssen,
supra note 146, at 667; Jensen, supra note 146, at 276 (stating that "[n]o economic leg-
islation of the eighteenth century was more characteristic than the attempt to maintain
the quality of exports by means of compulsory inspection laws").
150. See GIESECKE, supra note 146, at 74-80; NOVAK, supra note 146, at 88-89.
151. Janssen, supra note 146, at 665.
152. Hutt & Hutt, supra note 28, at 38-39.
153. Jensen, supra note 146, at 277-278.
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2. Early State Meat Inspection Statutes
Using the HeinOnline databases,' 54 I researched colonial and state
food inspection statutes prior to the enactment of the comprehensive 1907
Meat Inspection Act to determine whether they affected farm to consumer
sales of fresh meat or poultry in any way. This search revealed that, while
many states had some type of meat inspection statute, these statutes typical-
ly did not affect direct farm to consumer meat purchases. The statutes fell
into a number of categories. First, there were the meat inspection statutes
that applied only to exports.15 5 Second, while some states did require in-
spection of intrastate meat sales, they almost invariably governed only
cured meat that was sold in barrels.15 6 The third category consisted of in-
spection statutes that applied only to public markets.'57 The fourth catego-
ry required only inspection of the slaughtered animal's ears and hide.'58 A
fifth category provided for mandatory meat inspection, but only for meat
sold in urban areas.159 Sixth were the four states that passed mandatory
meat inspection laws in the late 1880's, however, these statutes were not
based on safety concerns. Rather, these laws were passed solely on eco-
nomic grounds, and the Supreme Court almost immediately held these stat-
utes to be unconstitutional in 1890, as will be discussed in Section V.C.2,
infra.
Only the following four states and territories required either ante-
mortem or postmortem inspection, or both, of all meat, fresh or cured, sold
within the state by 1907: a) Arizona;160 b) Massachusetts;' 6' c) Oklaho-
154. HeinOnline has two important databases of historical state statutes. The first is
its Session Laws Library, which "contains exact replications of the official bound ses-
sion laws of all fifty states" back to inception. HEINONLINE, SESSION LAWS LIBRARY,
http://heinonline.org/HeinDocs/DigitalSessionLaws.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2013).
The second is the HeinOnline State Statutes: A Historical Archive, which contains su-
perseded statutes for all fifty states going back to 1717. HEINONLINE STATUTES, A
HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, http://heinonline.org/HOL/Welcome?collection=ssl (last visited
Dec. 26, 2013). These databases give a nearly complete picture of state and colonial
laws going back to the seventeenth century.
155. See, e.g., Act to Regulate the Inspection of Beef and Pork, ch. CXLVIII (codi-
fied as 1821 Me. Laws 499).
156. See, e.g., An Act to Provide for Inspecting Pork and Beef, 1840 Mo. Laws 92.
157. NOVAK, supra note 146, at 97.
158. See, e.g., 1895 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4949.
159. See, e.g., 1889 Ind. Acts 150 (codified as IND. CODE § 8145 (1881)), invalidated
by State v. Klein, 126 Ind. 68, 25 N.E. 873 (1890); 1901 Mont. Laws 65 (codified as
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1540-43 (1907)), repealed by 1921 Mont. Laws 582.
160. 1905 Ariz. Sess. Laws 65, 89 (codified as ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 3739 (1913)).
161. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 75, § 105 (1901).
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ma;162 and d) Utah.16 3 This left forty-four states and territories with no
comprehensive mandatory inspection requirements at that time.'6
States remained reluctant to require comprehensive meat inspection
until well into the twentieth century. Even as late as 1967, the year Con-
gress enacted the Wholesome Meat Act, which required inspection of intra-
state meat sales for the first time, only twenty-eight states had mandatory
antemortem and postmortem meat inspection laws.16 5 Moreover, at least
six of those states had only passed their laws within the previous six
years.166 By 1967, about 15% of commercially slaughtered animals and
25% of commercially processed meat food products were sold intrastate,
and so they were still not federally or state inspected to a significant de-
167gree.16
3. Meat Inspection: The Exemptions
Many states had exemptions in their meat inspection statutes large
enough to drive a truck through. The statutes featured two types of exemp-
tions: a) the farm slaughtered meat exemption; and b) the rural district, or
"no inspector available" exemption. The ubiquity of the farm slaughtered
exemption shows that many state legislatures had carefully considered the
need to regulate meat sales, but affirmatively decided that the safety of
farm slaughtered meat meant that it did not warrant regulation.' 68
The farm slaughtered exemption typically exempted all meat
slaughtered by a farmer from otherwise mandatory state meat inspection.
At least fourteen states had enacted such exemptions over the years. Of the
twenty-eight states with mandatory meat inspection laws in 1967, twelve
had farm or other type of local slaughtered exemption.169 These statutes
162. 1897 Okla. Sess. Laws 237, 246 (codified as OKLA. STAT. tit. 3, § 19 (1903)).
163. 1907 Utah Laws 223 (codified as UTAH CODE ANN. § 1990 (West 1917)).
164. South Dakota passed a comprehensive mandatory meat inspection law in 1905,
but repealed it two years later. 1905 S.D. Sess. Laws 62, repealed by 1907 S.D. Sess.
Laws 80.
165. FEDERAL MEAT INSPECTION ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 90-653, at 4 (1967).
166. 1967 Ark. Acts 761; 1965 Iowa Acts 264; 1967 Mo. Laws 371; 1967 Nev. Stat.
1350; 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 900; 1966 Vt. Acts & Resolves 572.
167. FEDERAL MEAT INSPECTION ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 90-653, at 2 (1967).
168. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 286 (1995).
169. California (CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 307 (Deering 1933), as amended by 1963 Cal.
Stat. 1223); Illinois (1959 111. Laws 1944); Indiana (1967 Ind. Acts 1104); Iowa (1965
Iowa Acts 264); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 327.111 (1948)); Missouri (1967 Mo.
Laws 371); North Carolina (1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 459 and 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 900);
Oregon (1961 Or. Laws 156); Utah (1907 Utah Laws 223 (codified as UTAH CODE
ANN. § 3-10-68 (1943), as amended by 1957 Utah Laws 24 (limiting consumption of
meat to the farmer's own family)); Vermont (1966 Vt. Acts & Resolves 572); Wash-
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were passed at various times from 1901 to as late as just months before the
passage of the federal Wholesome Meat Act in 1967, and were from two of
the top three cattle producing states in 1966, Iowa and California, and four
of the top nine.170 Two other states, Idaho and Montana, had passed meat
inspection acts with farm slaughtered exemptions that were repealed or su-
perseded before World War 11.171 Indiana also had a prior farm slaughtered
exemption that was included in a state inspection statute that the Supreme
Court invalidated in Minnesota v. Barber in 1890, as will be discussed in
Section V.C.2, infra.17 2 Thus, of all of the states that had even passed
comprehensive meat inspection statutes prior to the passage of the compre-
hensive 1967 Wholesome Meat Act, fully half of them had specifically ex-
empted farm or other locally slaughtered meat.
The second type of exemption was the rural district or "no inspector
available" exemption. In states with this exemption, if no inspector was
available or if an inspector could not conveniently get to the farm in ques-
tion to inspect the meat, the farmer need not have the meat inspected before
sale. Four states had enacted such statutes over the years: a) Colorado; b)
Florida; c) Montana; and d) Oklahoma.17 3
That the American colonies and states had for centuries carefully
and affirmatively regulated food safety is obvious from the plethora of such
statutes. That many states carefully and affirmatively exempted fresh meat
from inspection for hundreds of years is also obvious from the sheer num-
ber and scope of food safety statutes. The only way to buy fresh meat until
after the Civil War was from one's local butcher, and, as discussed previ-
ously, no state required inspection of fresh meat for any reason until well
after then. Because most states required inspection of goods other than
fresh meat, putting two and two together tells us that state legislatures pre-
sumably considered whether fresh meat needed to be inspected, and con-
cluded that it did not. Finally, that many states carefully and affirmatively
ington (WASH. REV. CODE §16.49.210 (1951)); and West Virginia (1966 W. Va. Acts
685).
170. STATISTICAL REPORTING SERV, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTER
40 (1966).
171. Idaho (1911 Idaho Sess. Laws 607, amended by 1913 Idaho Sess. Laws 365
(codified as IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1326 (1932)), superseded by 1933 Idaho Sess.
Laws 108); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 1542 (1907), repealed by 1921 Mont. Laws
582).
172. IND. CODE § 8145 (1881), invalidated by State v. Klein, 126 Ind. 68, 25 N.E.
873 (1890).
173. 1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 244, invalidated by Schmidt v. People, 18 Colo. 78, 31 P.
498 (1892); 1885 Fla. Laws 57, repealed by 1891 Fla. Laws 84; 1901 Mont. Laws 65
(codified as MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1540-43 (1907)), repealed by 1921 Mont. Laws 582;
1905 Okla. Sess. Laws 44, 47 (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 2 § 8807 (1931)).
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exempted farm slaughtered meat from otherwise mandatory inspection is
similarly apparent from the number of such exemptions. Thus, farm-to-
consumer transactions can by no means be considered a traditionally un-
regulated area of commerce such that it is not deeply rooted in American
history and tradition.
C. Federal Law Affirmatively Preserved the Consumer's Right to
Purchase Meat Directly from the Farmer Without Inspection Until 1967
1. The Meat Inspection Acts
Consideration of the federal Meat Inspection Acts of 1890, 1891,
1906, and 1907, plus the 1938 amendment, dictates the same conclusion
that can be drawn from the state laws; until 1967, Congress affirmatively
regulated meat sales and affirmatively exempted farm slaughtered meat
from regulation. The original Meat Inspection Act of 1890 was very lim-
ited, requiring inspection only of "salted pork and bacon intended for ex-
portation." 74 The revised 1891 Act was more comprehensive, requiring
inspection of all live cattle intended for export and antemortem inspection
of "all cattle, sheep, and hogs which are subjects of interstate commerce
and which are about to be slaughtered at slaughter-houses, canning, salting,
packing or rendering establishments in any State or Territory."1 7 5 Postmor-
tem inspection was made optional.176 The Act contained an explicit farm
slaughtered exemption that stated that "none of the provisions of this act
shall be so construed as to apply to any cattle, sheep, or swine slaughtered
by any farmer upon his farm, which may be transported from one State or
Territory or the District of Columbia into another State or Territory or the
District of Columbia." 77
The 1906 and 1907 Meat Inspection Acts'"8 then reversed the 1891
Act's inspection requirements.' 79 Previously, antemortem examinations of
174. An Act Providing for an Inspection of Meats for Exportation, Prohibiting the
Importation of Adulterated Articles of Food or Drink, and Authorizing the President to
Make Proclamation in Certain Cases, and for Other Purposes, 26 Stat. 414 (1890).
175. An Act to Provide for the Inspection of Live Cattle, Hogs, and the Carcasses and
Products Thereof Which are the Subjects of Interstate Commerce, and for Other Pur-
poses, 26 Stat. 1089 (1891).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. An Act Making Appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the Fiscal
Year Ending June Thirtieth, Nineteen Hundred and Seven, 34 Stat. 669, 674-79 (1906);
An Act Making Appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the Fiscal Year
Ending June Thirtieth, Nineteenth Hundred and Eight, 34 Stat. 1256, 1260-65 (1907),
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animals intended for interstate commerce had been compulsory, and post-
mortem examinations were discretionary. Now, postmortem inspections
became mandatory and antemortem inspections became discretionary.
Both Acts retained the farm slaughtered exemption. The 1907 Act stood,
with only minor change, for sixty years until Congress replaced it in 1967
with the Wholesome Meat Act, which, for the first time, subjected all intra-
state meat sales to mandatory inspection and also removed the farm slaugh-
tered exemption for meat to be sold, substituting it with very limited ex-
emptions from inspection for meat to be used exclusively by the farmer's
family and for custom slaughtered beef.'80
2. The History of the Meat Inspection Acts
The legislative history of the Meat Inspection Acts, combined with
the history of non-Congressional events of those eras, shows that Congress
had never been concerned about the safety of farm slaughtered meat and
that it had "affirmatively determined that requiring [mandatory inspection
of farm slaughtered beef] was substantively inappropriate."' ' Thus, these
Acts do not raise the problem of the traditionally unregulated right ques-
tioned by Professor Barnett, Abigail Alliance II, and Williams.
a. Economic Concerns, Not Safety, Drove the Passage of the First Meat
Inspection Act
The 1890 Act's legislative history reveals that it was not food safety
concerns, but two unrelated economic concerns, that motivated Congress.
First, Europe started boycotting American pigs and pork in 1879 due to al-
leged safety concerns.182 Wanting to reclaim their business, the large
meatpackers sought governmental inspection as a way to demonstrate the
wholesomeness of their products.'83 Second, local butchers had been trying
codified as 21 U.S.C. §71 (1925). The farm slaughtered exemption appeared at 21
U.S.C. § 91.
179. 29 Op. Att'yGen. 355, 358 (1912).
180. Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967) (codified as 21
U.S.C. § 601 (2012)). The current exemption appears at 21 U.S.C. § 623.
181. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 286 (1995) (stating that "the lack of
federal regulation did not result from an affirmative decision of agency officials to re-
frain from regulating"); Lady v. Neal Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F.3d 598, 612 (5th Cir.
2000) (applying Freightliner in a preemption case), abrogated by Sprietsma v. Mercury
Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
182. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 320; KOLKO, supra note 40, at 98; Barkan, supra
note 142, at 23.
183. KOLKO, supra note 40, at 98; Kiehl & Rhodes, supra note 126, at 15.
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to stave off the large meatpackers' intrusion into their markets by claiming
that the national meatpackers slaughtered diseased cattle and that "dressed
beef was unwholesome.", 84 In the hopes of slowing the national meatpack-
ers' incursion into their livelihood, they lobbied state governments to pass
meat inspection laws requiring local antemortem inspection of cattle, ulti-
mately convincing three states and one territory, Minnesota, Indiana, Colo-
rado, and New Mexico, to pass such laws.185 Nothing was said about food
safety; the rationale for these laws was strictly economic. 186 Such a re-
quirement would have made the interstate meat trade economically infeasi-
ble, and so the national meatpackers challenged the constitutionality of
these laws, ultimately convincing the Supreme Court in 1890 to invalidate
the laws on the grounds that they unfairly affected interstate commerce. 187
To solve these two problems, a Senate Committee (the Vest Committee)
recommended in 1890 a national meat inspection scheme, as well as anti-
trust legislation (which became the Sherman Antitrust Act).'88 After Bar-
ber, the national meatpackers then joined the Vest Committee's call for
federal inspection as a permanent solution to the problem of local inspec-
tion.189
Either way, no evidence of any significant health issues over domes-
tic beef consumption emerged,190 and the demand for federal meat inspec-
tion requirements was certainly "not because Congress had in view the pro-
tection of the people of this country from the result of eating diseased
meats."' 9' In fact, the House Agriculture Committee report on the 1890
meat inspection bill flatly stated that the Committee did not believe the Eu-
ropean allegation of diseased pork and that it had no knowledge of the ex-
istence of disease in American pork, but that it was the Committee's duty
to do what needed to be done to satisfy European concerns over American
pork.1
92
184. Libecap, supra note 110, at 244.
185. INSPECTION OF LIVE CATTLE, ETC., H.R. REP. No. 51-3262, at 1 (1890); Libecap,
supra note 110, at 253.
186. McCurdy, supra note 128, at 646.
187. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890); FIELDS, supra note 126, at 133-34.
188. Libecap, supra note I10, at 255.
189. McCurdy, supra note 128, at 643-48.
190. Libecap, supra note 110, at 246, 251.
191. CLEMEN, supra note 126, at 323.
192. FUNSTON, INSPECTION OF MEATS FOR EXPORTATION, ETC., H.R. REP. No. 51-
1792, at 1 (1890) (Conf. Rep.).
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b. Congress was not Concerned with the Safety ofFarm Slaughtered Meat
In passing the Meat Inspection Acts, Congress implicitly and explic-
itly concerned itself only with food safety at the big meatpacking plants,
not with the safety of farm slaughtered fresh meat. For example, a clue to
Congress's implicit intent comes from an unusual juxtaposition of Con-
gressional findings for the 1891 Act. On the one hand, Congress acknowl-
edged that the layman could not detect unsafe or unwholesome meat, but,
on the other hand, in the same document, it considered inspection of farm
slaughtered meat to be impractical. First, the House Commerce Commit-
tee, in considering the Senate bill that became the basis for the 1891 Act,
quoted quite positively a letter from the Minnesota state veterinarian that
opined that "it is impossible for the masses" to determine the safety of
meat. 193 Nevertheless, the House subsequently "almost unanimously re-
volted"'9 4 against the Senate bill and demanded, among other changes, the
farm slaughtered exemption, which had not been in the original bill,'95 as
the price of passing the 1891 Act. 19 6 The most reasonable inference to
draw from this combination of statements is that Congress simply was not
concerned with any safety issues from farm slaughtered meat. Otherwise,
how else could the House pronounce the average consumer incapable of
ascertaining meat quality, but then allow farm slaughtered meat to be sold
to the consumer without inspection?
The year of 1906 proved no different. A House Committee report
that year pleaded that "the most rigid inspection of the meat and meat food
products which constitute so large a part of the food of the country must be
insured."' 97 But the plea fell on deaf ears. The Committee approved the
continued exemption from inspection of farm slaughtered meat.198
More explicitly that year, in the House Agriculture Committee hear-
ings for an amendment (the Beveridge Amendment) to the bill that became
the 1906 Act, a Department of Agriculture solicitor, George P. McCabe,
testified that "[t]he impression that we have had in regard to that is that this
legislation was directed toward the proprietors of canning, slaughtering,
193. STOCKBRIDGE, INSPECTION OF LIVE CATTLE, ETC., H.R. REP. NO. 51-3262, at 1
(1890) (Conf. Rep.).
194. 22 CONG. REC. 43,713 (1891).
195. 22CONG.REC. 1422 (1891).
196. HATCHER, INSPECTION OF LIVE CATTLE, ETC., H.R. REP. No. 51-3761, at I
(1891) (Conf. Rep.).
197. WADSWORTH, AMENDMENTS TO AGRICULTURE APPROPRIATION BILL, H.R. REP.
No. 59-4953, at 5 (1906) (Conf. Rep.).
198. Id.
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rendering, and packing establishments."' 99 For McCabe, the conditions in
the Chicago packing houses were the single reason for the passage of the
Meat Inspection Act. 20 0 In fact, "Conditions in Chicago Stock Yards" was
the running header of the hearing testimony published by the House Agri-
culture Committee.20 1
President Roosevelt agreed with McCabe. The only area of concern
to the President was the conditions in the Chicago stock yards.20 2 A 1906
Attorney General opinion confirmed that:
[i]t is well known that [the 1906 Meat Inspection Act] was
enacted by Congress immediately in response to the mes-
sage of the President of June 4, 1906, transmitting the re-
port of Messrs. Reynolds and Neill, who had been appoint-
ed by him to investigate the conditions in the Chicago
stock yards and packing houses.2 03
And even when focus is limited to the conditions in the Chicago stock-
yards, freshly slaughtered (dressed) beef was not a concern; it was only
packaged beef that people were worried about. Solicitor McCabe later
wrote that, "[a]t no time during the investigation of the packing-house con-
ditions was there any considerable complaint against fresh meats (which
would have included farm slaughtered meat). The criticism was directed
199. Hearings Before the Committee on Agriculture on the So-called "Beveridge
Amendment" to the Agricultural Appropriation Bill (H.R. 1853) as Passed by the Sen-
ate May 25, 1906 - To Which are Added Various Documents Bearing Upon the "Beve-
ridge Amendment, " 59th Cong. 93 (1906) (statement of George P. McCabe, Solicitor
for the Department of Agriculture) [hereinafter Hearings on the Beveridge Amend-
ment].
200. George P. McCabe, The New Meat-Inspection Law and its Bearing Upon the
Production and Handling of Meats, 101 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUS. CIRCULAR 5, 14 (1907).
201. See Hearings on the Beveridge Amendment, supra note 199, at 261.
202. Id
203. 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 50, 51 (1906). Later, an opinion repeated this position, stating
that:
[t]he meat inspection and sanitation provisions were ... introduced
late in the debate and was directed to curing the "evils" of the pack-
ing industry. The debate in the Senate centered not on the types of
establishments to be subjected to the inspection and sanitation re-
quirements, but on the issue of whether the "packers" or the federal
government should pay the costs of inspection.
42 Op. Att'y Gen. 459, 462 (1972).
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against conditions of filth and uncleanliness in the preparation and handling
of prepared meat-food products."204
The following year, the Chief of the Department of Agriculture's
Bureau of Animal Industry, Dr. Alonzo D. Melvin, testified in the commit-
tee hearings for the 1907 Act in response to questions about whether the
previous year's expos6 of unsafe conditions in the meatpacking industry (as
depicted in Upton Sinclair's The Jungle) had affected American meat ex-
ports. He testified that, "I think that the meat that was affected by this agi-
tation was almost entirely confined to canned meats. I do not think our
fresh meat suffered at all." 2 05 Farmers, of course, produced fresh meat.
Three decades later, Congress amended the Meat Inspection Act.206
It was a minor amendment, but it should be interpreted as another affirma-
tive Congressional statement of confidence of the safety of farm-raised
meat. The amendment was passed in order to define the term "farmer," be-
cause unscrupulous livestock buyers were buying unwholesome calves and
taking advantage of the farm slaughtered exemption (which also included a
limited retailer exemption) to sell them without inspection.2 07 Congress
could have shut the whole thing down right then and there; it could have
simply eliminated the farm slaughtered exemption and moved on. But it
did not. The amendment was an unspoken Congressional vote of confi-
dence in the farmer's continued ability to provide safe meat for the con-
sumer.
Finally, and significantly, at no point in any of the Congressional
debates on any of the four Meat Inspection Acts did any legislator raise any
concerns over the safety of farm slaughtered meat.208 Nor did Congress,
when it eliminated the farm slaughtered exemption in 1967, express any
concerns over the safety of farm slaughtered meat.209
204. McCabe, supra note 200, at 14.
205. Hearings Before the Committee on Agriculture on the Estimates of Appropria-
tions for the Department ofAgriculture for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1908, 59th
Cong. 244 (1907) (statement of Alonzo D. Melvin, Chief of the Bureau of Animal In-
dustry).
206. Meat Inspection Act of March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. 1260 (codified as 21 U.S.C. §
71).
207. FLANNAGAN, AMEND. MEAT INSPECTION ACT, H.R. REP. No. 75-2310, at 3
(1938) (Conf. Rep.).
208. GEORGE P. MCCABE, U. S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., INDEX TO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
ACTS OF CONGRESS INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 1,
6-7, 26-27, 30 (1912). This publication contains an index to the Congressional debates
for, among other acts, the four Meat Inspection Acts. With this document as a guide, I
was able to read the Congressional debates for the Meat Inspection Acts. Whenever
any Congressman raised food safety, it was always about the meatpackers. There were
no negative statements about farm-raised meat.
209. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REC. 30,508-551 (1967).
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This evidence is more than sufficient to show that farm raised meat
is not a traditionally unregulated right. For eight decades, Congress had
considered national meat safety and always believed that farmers could be
trusted to raise and produce safe meat.
D. Farm Slaughtered Meat: The Statistics
Farm slaughtered meat was still very common at the turn of the
twentieth century. By 1903, 11% of American cattle was still farm slaugh-
tered. 210 By 1909, after the passage of the 1906 and 1907 Meat Inspection
Acts, that figure had decreased only slightly, to 10 .3%.211 However, it was
far higher for veal calves (17.4% of the total) and for hogs (28.9% of the
total). 212 By 1916, farm slaughtered cattle maintained a substantial pres-
ence in many states, including New Hampshire (13% of the total), Maine
(12.3%), North Carolina (11.7%), and Florida (11.0%).213 While farm
slaughtered animals were generally sold to local butchers, farmers would
still sell them on the farm directly to consumers at that time.214 The
amount of farm slaughtered beef decreased substantially during the twenti-
eth century, but even as late as 1961, six years before the passage of the
1967 federal Wholesome Meat Act, farmers still farm slaughtered 3.2% of
American cattle, and, in 1965, 2.5% of cattle were still farm slaughtered. 2 15
E. Poultry Develops from a Trade to an Industry
Poultry was a strictly local commodity that did not become big
business until well after World War 11.216 As late as the early 1920's, there
was still no American poultry industry to speak of.217 Approximately 90%
of all American farms as of that time kept a small flock of chickens for
eggs; chicken sales in this era were primarily a byproduct of egg produc-
210. HALL ET AL., supra note 145, at 16.
211. Id. at 12.
212. Id. at 15.
213. Id. at 8-9.
214. Id. at 60.
215. STATISTICAL REPORTING SERV, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 170, at 5.
216. 103 CONG. REC. 11,123 (1957) (statement of Rep. Leonor Sullivan); STEVE
STRIFFLER, CHICKEN: THE DANGEROUS TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA'S FAVORITE
FOOD 32 (2005); James A. Albert, A History ofAttempts by the Department ofAgricul-
ture to Reduce Federal Inspection of Poultry Processing Plants - A Return to the Jun-
gle, 51 LA. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1991).
217. Marc Linder, I Gave My Employer a Chicken that Had No Bone: Joint Firm-
State Responsibility for Line-Speed-Related Occupational Injuries, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 33, 43 (1995).
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218tion. The modem broiler industry began in the mid 1920's in Delaware,
although it was not until the 1940's and 1950's that it really began to take
off due in part to American war policies and price subsidies during World
War 11.219 One can better appreciate how the broiler industry went from ze-
ro to a chicken in every pot by taking in the consumption statistics-from
0.5 pounds of chicken eaten per capita in 1934 to 60.3 pounds per capita in
1987.220
1. State Poultry Inspection Statutes
Even as late as 1968, only twelve states had mandatory poultry in-
221spection laws, and only four had active inspection programs. Moreover,
eight of those twelve states exempted either farm slaughtered poultry or
poultry sold very locally. 22 2 A total of 13% of American poultry was still
slaughtered without federal inspection at that time.2 23 However, this pauci-
ty of regulation should still not be interpreted as a traditionally unregulated
industry. As stated above, poultry was barely an industry until the Great
Depression; Americans simply did not eat poultry in any significant
amount until after World War II. They ate eggs and the occasional chick-
en. Accordingly, poultry was not a traditionally unregulated industry; ra-
ther, it had not been an industry at all until the 1930's and 1940's. To be
218. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Legislation Affecting the Food and Drug
Administration of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 84th Cong. 23 (1956)
(statement of Earl L. Butz, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture) [hereinafter Statement of
Earl L. Butz]; WRIGHT PATMEN ET AL., PROBLEMS IN THE POULTRY INDUSTRY, H.R.
REP. No. 85-2717, at 2 (1959); DONALD D. STULL & MICHAEL J. BROADWAY,
SLAUGHTERHOUSE BLUES: THE MEAT AND POULTRY INDUSTRY IN NORTH AMERICA 43-
44 (2nd ed. 2013).
219. Statement of Earl L. Butz, supra note 218, at 23. (noting that "[c]ommercial
broiler production was hardly recognized as an industry in the late thirties");
STRIFFLER, supra note 216, at 33-35, 43.
220. FLOYD A. LASLEY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC
REPORT No. 591: THE U.S. BROILER INDUSTRY 8-9 (1988).
221. WHOLESOME POULTRY PRODUCTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 90-1333, at 4 (1968)
(Conf. Rep.).
222. California (1955 Cal Stat. 3417, 3418-19), Delaware (191 Del. Laws 628, 638
(1967)), Illinois (1959 Ill. Laws 1944), Iowa (1965 Iowa Acts 264), and Missouri (1967
Mo. Laws 371) had straightforward farm slaughtered exemptions. Indiana (1967 Ind.
Acts 1104) and North Carolina (1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 1183, 1184) exempted intra-
country poultry sales from inspection. Tennessee exempted farm slaughtered poultry
from inspection when the farmers slaughtered the animals for their own consumption
and sold the excess directly to consumers. 1967 Tenn. Pub. Acts 261.
223. WHOLESOME POULTRY PRODUCTS ACT, S. REP. No. 90-1449, at 3 (1968) (Conf.
Rep.).
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concerned with the lack of poultry regulations before World War II would
be equivalent to being concerned with the lack of internet regulations prior
to the 1990's. Then, once the industry arose, governmental regulation fol-
lowed. But, just as with meat inspection, a substantial number - in fact, a
majority - of state poultry inspection statutes recognized the safety of farm
slaughtered or locally raised poultry and exempted such poultry from oth-
erwise mandatory inspection.
2. The Poultry Inspection Acts
Although an early draft of the 1906 meat inspection bill called for
poultry inspection, only meat remained in the final bill, 2 24 and so the Poul-
try Products Inspection Act of 1957 became the first federal poultry inspec-
tion act.225 The Act required both antemortem and postmortem inspection
of all poultry slaughtered in "any official establishment processing poultry
or poultry products for commerce or in, or for marketing in a designated
city or area."226 Like the Meat Inspection Acts, the Poultry Products In-
spection Act exempted from inspection poultry raised by poultry producers
on their own farms which are sold directly to household consumers or res-
taurants, hotels, and boarding houses for use in their own dining rooms or
in the preparation of meals for sales direct to consumers only.227 But only
eleven years later, Congress passed the Wholesome Poultry Products Act,
which substantially limited the farm slaughtered exemption. 2 28 As rewrit-
ten, the Act exempted farm slaughtered poultry from inspection only for
farmers who slaughter or process the products of more than 5000 turkeys or
20,000 chickens or other domesticated birds per year.229 Congress later re-
vised the exemption to eliminate the chicken and turkey distinction, and the
exemption now applies to all farmers who slaughter fewer than 20,000
birds per year.230
224. KOLKO, supra note 40, at 104.
225. Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957) (codi-
fied as 21 U.S.C. §451 (1958)).
226. Id. at § 6(a).
227. Id. at § 15(a)(1).
228. Wholesome Poultry Products Act, Pub. L. No. 90-492, 82 Stat. 791 (1968) (cod-
ified as 21 U.S.C. §451 (2012)).
229. Id. at § 14(c)(3).
230. 21 U.S.C. § 464(c)(1)(A-D) (2006).
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3. The Poultry Inspection Acts: Legislative History
In debating the Poultry Inspection Acts, Congress strongly vouched for
the safety of farm raised and slaughtered poultry. Congressmen and Con-
gresswomen went out of their way to emphasize the safety of the poultry
raised by the local farmer. For example, in debating the 1957 Act, several
legislators pointedly recounted, without rebuttal, how they and their neigh-
bors would buy their poultry from the local farmer without any need for in-
spection and without any safety concerns over potentially unsanitary pro-
cessing.231 It was Congresswoman Leonor Sullivan who hit the nail right
on the head by stating:
Now let me explain how the need for this poultry leg-
islation has arisen. One might ask why we suddenly need
poultry inspection laws when we have managed to get
along for 51 years since the passage of the Meat Inspection
Act without having poultry included along with the red
meats-beef, pork, lamb-under a compulsory inspection
system.
There are two answers to that question. One is that
until food technology and refrigeration engineering made
possible freezing and nationwide distribution of poultry by
big firms, you usually bought a chicken or turkey raised
not far from where you lived, and sold by a farmer from
his truck or sold by a neighborhood storekeeper whom you
knew had a good reliable supplier from a nearby farm.
But in recent years, poultry has gone bigtime and big
business. The small farmer is not a factor. As a matter of
fact, under this bill, the farmer can still raise his chickens
and take them to town and sell them directly to the house-
wife without having to worry about inspection. But when
you buy his poultry you know where that chicken comes
from. 232
231. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Legislation Affecting the Food and Drug
Administration of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare United States Senate,
84th Cong. 2 (1956) (statement of Senator James Murray) (stating that "I have been
convinced that S. 3176 should be amended to exempt from inspection poultry slaugh-
tered, dressed, and sold to the ultimate consumer by farmers themselves"); 103 CONG.
REC. 11,122-123 (1957) (statements of Congresswomen Cornelia Knutson and Leonor
Sullivan).
232. 103 CONG. REC. 11,123 (1957).
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Congresswoman Sullivan told the truth that dared not to be told. Small
and local was safer than big and distant, or so people believed. As was
seen in Section I, supra, this is one of the factors that now drives the local
food movement.
The House Agriculture Committee's formal reason for the farm
slaughtered exemption was twofold and particularly telling: first, it did not
want to burden small farmers "who are marketing wholesome poultry
products" as a side business, and second, requiring inspection of all poultry
sold in the country would simply be impracticable.23 3 The Committee thus
assumed that the small farmers would be marketing wholesome poultry
products.
F. Conclusion
The main conclusion to be drawn from the history of the Meat and
Poultry Inspection Acts is that meat has been subject to heavy governmen-
tal regulation since the 1600's, but that governments, both state and federal,
maintained a hands-off approach to farm to consumer meat transactions un-
til relatively recently in our history. There was far less government regula-
tion of poultry throughout the years, but there was also far less commerce
in poultry. Once the poultry trade matured into an industry, governmental
regulation appeared to control it, again with a hands-off approach to farm
to consumer poultry transactions. For these reasons, Americans can make a
strong argument that they have a deeply rooted tradition of purchasing meat
and poultry directly from their local farmer without governmental interfer-
ence.
VI. THE CONSUMER'S RIGHT To PURCHASE MEAT AND POULTRY
DIRECTLY FROM THE FARMER WITHOUT MANDATORY GOVERNMENT
INSPECTION Is A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
In Section IV, I defined the proposed right carefully. In Section V, I
showed that the right is deeply rooted in American history and tradition.
Now we will see that the right to purchase meat and poultry of one's choice
directly from the farmer who raised the animals, without mandatory gov-
ernmental inspection, is indeed a fundamental liberty right protected by the
Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
233. WHOLESOME POULTRY PRODUCTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 90-1333, at 14 (1968)
(Conf. Rep.).
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A. The Surprisingly Inclusive Definitions ofLiberty and Privacy
The Supreme Court has defined liberty very broadly over the years.
One seeking to show that he has a protected right to purchase food of his
choice directly from the farmer or producer, or that food choice is essential
to one's self-identity or self-expression, can point to many expansive defi-
nitions of the concept over the years. A logical starting point is the Su-
preme Court's famous 1923 definition, in which it stated that liberty:
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up chil-
dren, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men.234
Given that American history and traditions have long included the
right to purchase meat and poultry directly from the farmer without gov-
ernmental interference, the common law surely recognizes that activity as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. And with respect
to the pursuit of happiness, our most philosophical Founding Father,
Thomas Jefferson, who knew a little about that quest, once warned that:
[t]he legitimate powers of government extend to such acts
only as are injurious to others.... Was the government to
prescribe to us our medicine and diet, our bodies would be
in such keeping as our souls are now. Thus in France the
emetic was once forbidden as medicine, and the potatoe as
an article of food.235
Today, by barring the door to the purchase of farm slaughtered meat and
poultry without governmental interference, governments are, as Jefferson
counseled against, prescribing our diet to us.
Governmental prohibition of private farm to consumer transactions
also limits Americans' liberty to take the risks that they wish to take. As
food lawyer Peter Hutt wrote:
234. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
235. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 235-36 (3d American
Ed. 1801).
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even the most unsophisticated citizen can readily deter-
mine that the risks from some of the dangers charged to the
food supply are far smaller than the risks that we willingly
accept without question as we go about our daily busi-
ness. . . . Since we are free to choose or reject many other
risks, it is difficult for the public to perceive why we
should not also be free to choose, on an individual basis,
the risks that we will accept in the food we eat.236
All forms of living entail some amount of risk. To the extent that eat-
ing uninspected, farm slaughtered meat and poultry is riskier than consum-
ing industrial meat and poultry from Big Food, which is a subject beyond
the scope of this article, it should be for the consumer to determine how
much governmental protection and how much risk she wants.
The Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Assistant Commission-
er for Professional and Consumer Programs acknowledged decades ago
that "[c]onsumers want to know, 'How much risk exists?' At the same
time, they want to retain the right to take risks, if they feel the benefits are
great enough," and that "[r]ealistically, we know that consumers do not and
will not have their food habits dictated to them by a regulatory agency."2 3 7
The then Acting Director of the FDA's Bureau of Foods bluntly stated that
"we should stop pretending that absolute safety for food is possible. It
isn't, for there is virtually no food that is without some risk to some person.
We should acknowledge and explain this to the public." 2 38 A dissenting
opinion from the Minnesota Supreme Court in a dispute over the sale of un-
inspected meat touched on this issue, perhaps even touching a nerve with a
demand for the evidence of comparative risk between farm slaughtered
meat and Big Food's meat, opining that:
[d]espite the fact that custom processors may return unin-
spected, processed meats to an unlimited number of quali-
fying persons for individual use, a farmer may not sell his
own custom-processed meats to the public. If the former
does not present a public health risk, it is difficult to see
236. Peter Barton Hutt, The Basis and Purpose of Government Regulation of Adul-
teration and Misbranding ofFood, 33 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 505, 528 (1978).
237. William V. Whitehom, Consumer Interests - Do We Get the Foods We Want?,
31 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 656, 657, 661 (1976).
238. Peter Barton Hutt, Unresolved Issues in the Conflict between Individual Free-
dom and Government Control of Food Safety, 33 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 558, 563
(1978) (citing 124 CONG. REC. E1310 (1978)).
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how the latter does, especially considering the low volume
of sales normally associated with sales by a single
farmer.239
B. Liberty and Philosophy
For the philosophers, the idea of liberty means that a person has "the
'right' to make his own choices no matter how foolish or self-defeating
such choices may be." 240 Advocates of this school of thought included
John Locke, "the ideological father of the American revolution,"24 1 and
John Stuart Mill, the great nineteenth century proponent of liberty. For
Locke, "individuals do not give up to the government those rights of self-
autonomy that do not threaten to invade the rights of others or to cause
harm to others." 242 Mill wrote more explicitly, stating that:
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot
rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise
or even right.243
Liberty, for Mill, clearly "entails the right to make bad decisions and
poor choices."244 According to Mill, "[t]he only part of the conduct of any
one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, abso-
lute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sover-
eign." 245 While the Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted this position,
239. Minnesota v. Hartmann, 700 N.W.2d 449, 461 (Minn. 2005) (G. Barry Ander-
son, J., dissenting).
240. ROBERT YOUNG, PERSONAL AUTONOMY: BEYOND NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE
LIBERTY 63 (1986).
241. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796, 815 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
242. Mark C. Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative To Substantive
Due Process Analysis Of Personal Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 85, 112-13
(2000); Kevin S. Toll, The Ninth Amendment and America's Unconstitutional War on
Drugs, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 417, 420 (2007).
243. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in THREE ESSAYS 5, 15 (1966).
244. THOMAS FLEINER-GERSTER & LIDIJA R. BASTA FLEINER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY IN A MULTICULTURAL AND GLOBALISED WORLD 205 (2009).
245. Mill, supra note 243.
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lower courts have traced the modem American notions of personal auton-
omy and the right of self-determination back to Locke and Mill's ideas on
liberty.246 At least several lower court judges have explicitly agreed with
Mill's idea that liberty grants one the right to be wrong.247 Locke's and
Mill's views on liberty and autonomy thus clearly point the way to a consti-
tutional right to be free from governmental involvement in a private farm to
consumer meat or poultry sale.
However, the food rights advocate should be aware that Mill is not
the last word on liberty. Although courts, including the Supreme Court,
have invoked Mill from time to time, 248 Supreme Court Justice Powell, sit-
ting by designation on the Eleventh Circuit after his retirement from the
Supreme Court, sniffed that "the impressive pedigree of [Mill's] political
ideal does not readily translate into a constitutional right." 249
C. Liberty Includes the Right to Self-Identity
In 1984, the Supreme Court explicitly included self-identity within
the ambit of protected liberty interests, holding in a case involving the right
to association that the ability to "define one's identity" is "central to any
concept of liberty." 2 50 Another indispensable element of liberty is the abil-
246. See, e.g., In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. at 815-16; Arm-
strong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 372-73 (Mont. 1999); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hospital, Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 950
(Me. 1987).
247. In re Fisher, 552 N.Y.S.2d 807, 813 n. 17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (noting that
"[t]he fact that someone else might, or could make better choices is not the point. In a
constitutional system such as ours which prizes and protects individual liberties to
make decisions, even bad ones, the right to make those decisions must be preserved");
Richards v. State, 743 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that "'[liberty'
also necessarily implies one's acceptance of the risks involved in being free to make
mistakes, to be foolish, to err, to blunder, without being punished by the social organi-
zation unless harm is thereby inflicted on others") (Levy, J., dissenting); State v. Betts,
21 Ohio Misc. 175, 184 (1969) (noting that "[i]ncluded in man's 'liberty' is the free-
dom to be as foolish, foolhardy or reckless as he may wish, so long as others are not
endangered thereby. The State of Ohio has no legitimate concern with whether or not
an individual cracks his skull while motorcycling; that is his personal risk").
248. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 465, 467 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that "[t]he Framers of the Constitution would doubtless have agreed with
the great English political philosopher John Stuart Mill"); New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 n. 13 (1964).
249. Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Williams v. At-
torney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11 th Cir. 2004) (stating that "[r]egardless of
[Mill's] force as a policy argument, however, it does not translate ipse dixit into a con-
stitutionally cognizable standard").
250. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
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ity to further personal bonds "by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals
and beliefs." 25 1 Then there is the plurality opinion in Casey, which stated
that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of ex-
istence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Be-
liefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State." 25 2 The right to define one's
own concept of existence surely includes the right to decide what foods one
wants to eat and where and how one wants to purchase them. 253 Lawrence
continued this theme, holding that "[1]iberty presumes an autonomy of self
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct ... [both in] its spatial and in its more transcendent dimen-
sions." 254 Even brief definitions from the Supreme Court include such pro-
nouncements as: "[i]n a Constitution for a free people, there can be no
doubt that the meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed," 25 5 and liberty
"extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pur-
sue."256 Once again, the full range of conduct that one might want to pur-
sue is buying one's meat and poultry in a private transaction, without gov-
ernmental interference, from the farmer who raised the animals.
D. Liberty Includes the Right to Self-Expression
Americans' liberty rights have long since included self-
expression.25 7 As the Supreme Court has held, "it is a prized American
privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste,
on all public institutions." 258
251. Id.
252. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
253. See Alan Rubel, Local Trans Fats Bans and Consumer Autonomy, 10 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 41, 42 (2010) (stating that "[t]he freedom to choose what we eat is im-
portant insofar as it is a function of persons' autonomy over their food choices. That is,
personal autonomy is what underwrites the value of choosing what we eat.").
254. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
255. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
256. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
257. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 847 F. Supp. 178,
196 (D. Mass. 1994) (noting that "[o]f course, the party seeking to communicate has an
individual liberty interest in self-expression.").
258. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941); see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 783 (1985) (stating that "[t]he free speech
guarantee gives each citizen an equal right to self-expression").
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E. Concurring and Dissenting Supreme Court and Lower Court Opin-
ions on Liberty are Even Broader
Concurring and dissenting opinions from the Supreme Court have
been particularly far reaching. Justice Blackmun wrote in Casey that "per-
sonal decisions that profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and destiny
should be largely beyond the reach of government." 25 9  Concurring in
Glucksberg, Justice Stevens cited his earlier Seventh Circuit holding that
the liberty clause "brings to mind the origins of the American heritage of
freedom - the abiding interest in individual liberty that makes certain state
intrusions on the citizen's right to decide how he will live his own life in-
tolerable."' 26 0 Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Doe v. Bolton, the
companion case to Roe v. Wade, contains as broad a definition of liberty as
has been seen in American jurisprudence. For Justice Douglas, liberty in-
cludes, among other rights: a) "the autonomous control over the develop-
ment and expression of one's intellect, interests, tastes, and personality;"
and b) "the freedom to care for one's health and person, freedom from bod-
ily restraint or compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf."2 6 1
Appellate decisions also paint with a broad brush. In reversing
summary judgment for the defendant police department in a hair grooming
case, the Second Circuit held that "[p]ersonal liberty is not composed simp-
ly and only of freedoms held to be fundamental but includes the freedom to
make and act on less significant personal decisions without arbitrary gov-
ernment interference." 26 2 In another hair length case, the First Circuit held
that liberty "seems to us an incomplete protection if it encompasses only
the right to do momentous acts, leaving the state free to interfere with
those personal aspects of our lives which have no direct bearing on the abil-
ity of others to enjoy their liberty." 2 63 Given that food choice is somewhat
less momentous than such life-altering decisions as abortion or marriage,
259. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 927 (1992) (Blackmun,
J., concurring and dissenting).
260. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 744-45 (1997) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem'1 Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975)
(footnotes omitted).
261. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211-13 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). A feder-
al judge cited this concurrence in ruling that the constitutional liberty guarantee pro-
tected parents' right to name their child whatever they wanted. Jech v. Burch, 466 F.
Supp. 714, 719 (D. Haw. 1979).
262. Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1973); see also BAM Historic
Dist. Ass'n v. Koch, 723 F.2d 233, 237 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that liberty "includes the
opportunity to make a range of personal decisions concerning one's life, family, and
private pursuits").
263. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1970).
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Dwen and Richards, as well as Justice Douglas's Doe concurrence, protect
a right to food choice by showing that our constitutional liberty rights pro-
tect the smaller things in life as well as the big.
F. Defining Privacy
The Supreme Court has recognized two separate types of privacy
rights: a) "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters;" and b) "the interest in independence in making certain kinds of im-
portant decisions." 264 The first right is often referred to as the "confidenti-
ality" branch, and the second the "autonomy" branch.265  Only the
autonomy branch is relevant for the practitioner advocating a consumer's
right to food choice. While the Court has not defined the "outer limits" of
the right to privacy, 266 it has only explicitly found privacy rights in matters
involving marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
childrearing and education.267 However, Justice Douglas would add to the
right to privacy "the privilege of an individual to plan his own affairs, for,
'outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape
his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases."' 2 68
Lower courts have made clear that, at least in the medical treatment
context, the right to privacy means "the sanctity of individual free choice
and self-determination." 2 69 In finding a privacy right in a patient's right to
receive acupuncture from a traditional acupuncture practitioner, as opposed
to a licensed physician, the Southern District of Texas in Andrews v. Bal-
lard defined Carey 's "important decision" requirement as a decision that
"must profoundly affect one's development or one's life." 2 70 Andrews' rea-
soning is helpful to the food rights campaign. If choices in food are im-
portant decisions, perhaps even very important decisions that profoundly
affect one's life, then certainly our constitutional right to privacy should
protect such choices.
264. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
265. Pouliot v. Town of Fairfield, 226 F. Supp.2d 233, 247 (D. Me. 2002).
266. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85.
267. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
268. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
269. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426
(Mass. 1977).
270. Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1046 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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G. You Are What You Eat: Food Choice as a Part of Self-Identity and
Self-Expression
1. What are Self-Identity and Self-Expression?
As an academic term, "self-identity refers to the understanding that
an individual has of himself or herself."27 1 Another way to put it is that
self-identity is one's "life story." 2 72 Self-expression is closely related to
self-identity. Then, if self-identity is one's life story, self-expression is tell-
ing one's life story to someone else; it is the "assertion of one's individual
traits."273 A person might use his self-identity and self-expression to an-
swer the question, "who am I?",274 And, in academia, the question "who am
I?" necessarily incorporates the question "what do I eat?"
2. What is Food Choice?
Modem sociological research has confirmed the obvious; you truly
are what you eat. Human food preferences are some of the oldest human
inclinations; in fact, food choice is "close to the center of [human] self-
definition."275 It is religious and cultural expression.276 For millennia, hu-
mans have traditionally thought of food choice as a means of distinguishing
between their tribe, group, or culture and the alien, enemy tribes or
groups.277 Modern social science research recognizes that food choice is
"fundamental to our sense of self,"278 a method of assigning identity to
oneself and to others,279 a way to act upon one's personal ideologies,280 a
271. RONALD L. JACKSON II, ED., 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IDENTITY 547 (2010).
272. Id.
273. Heejung S. Kim & David K. Sherman, "Express Yourself': Culture and the Ef-
fect of Self-Expression on Choice, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2007)
(quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2006)).
274. E.g., PAMELA GOYAN KITTLER & KATHRYN P. SUCHER, FOOD AND CULTURE 15
(4th ed. 2004); Jostein Rise et al., The Role of Self-Identity in the Theory of Planned
Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 40 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1085, 1087 (2010).
275. SIDNEY W. MINTZ, SWEETNESS AND POWER: THE PLACE OF SUGAR IN MODERN
HISTORY 3 (1986).
276. See Rencher, supra note 23, at 431-36.
277. Id
278. Avi Brisman, Fair Fare? Food as Contested Terrain in U.S. Prisons and Jails,
15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 49, 52 (2008).
279. Bisogni, supra note 12, at 129.
280. J. Pollard et al., Factors Affecting Food Choice in Relation to Fruit and Vegeta-
ble Intake: A Review, 15 NUTRITION RES. REv. 373, 381-82 (2002).
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28 1 282way to make sense of the world,28' a political statement, and a way to
create meaning in one's life. 2 83 Food choice is "a basic form of self-
creating, self-expression, and self-definition."284 It is so basic that the "cor-
relation between what people eat, how others perceive them, and how they
characterize themselves [has been called] striking." 2 85 Even a brief review
of the social science literature on the subject shows that there are no contra-
ry views.
3. Social Science is Valid Evidence
While American courts have not yet acknowledged food choice as a
component of self-identity or self-expression, this does not necessarily pre-
clude the possibility in the future. American jurisprudence unquestionably
accepts social science opinions. For more than a century, the Supreme
Court has employed social science opinions in constitutional disputes, 28 6
notably utilizing it in Brown v. Board of Education, in which it cited nu-
merous such studies in support of its opinion.28 7 Since Brown, the Court
has frequently consulted social science research in cases involving school
desegregation, the death penalty, obscenity, and juvenile delinquency,
among other topics.288 As of 1986, all nine sitting Justices of the Supreme
Court had "either authored or joined opinions using social science research
to establish or criticize a rule of law." 289 Parties can present social science
research through expert testimony or include it in a brief (e.g., the famous
"Brandeis" brief),290 although such evidence would certainly be more cred-
281. Bruce Pietrykowski, You Are What You Eat: The Social Economy of the Slow
Food Movement, 17 REV. OF Soc. EcoN. 307, 310 (2004).
282. Johnson & Endres, supra note 3, at 56; Bean, supra note 13, at 50.
283. Bean, supra note 13, at 37-40.
284. Assya Pascalev, You Are What You Eat: Genetically Modified Foods, Integrity,
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426.
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(noting that "[h]istorically, beginning with 'Louis Brandeis' use of empirical evidence
before the Supreme Court . .. persuasive social science evidence has been presented to
the courts"') (quoting Forst, Rhodes & Wellford, Sentencing and Social Science: Re-
2013] 217
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
ible if a qualified expert testified and was subject to cross-examination on
the issue. But either way, a trial court must consider properly introduced
social science opinions as to the significance of food choice.
H. American Jurisprudence Has Acknowledged the Significance of
Food Choice
The legal world uses the same definition as the academic world for
self-identity and self-expression.291 In the courts, just as in academia, a
person would employ his self-identity and self-expression to answer the
question, "who am I?",292 However, no decision has addressed the relation-
ship between liberty, self-identity and self-expression, and food choice.
The question of whether any aspect of food choice is a fundamental right
has not to date been presented to an American court.
But the courts have offered some fleeting acknowledgments of the
significance of food choice. The first known instance of an American court
recognizing, even in passing, a citizen's right of food choice was in a nine-
teenth century dispute over a Missouri oleomargarine statute.293 In that
case, the Missouri Court of Appeals criticized the nascent oleomargarine
industry, stating that:
[a] practice has sprung up which operates to defraud the
people of their right of choice as to what they will eat [i.e.,
ostensibly counterfeit food such as oleomargarine], with
reference to an article of food of constant and universal
consumption. The legislature has passed an act which, if
properly administered, will nip the practice in the bud.294
Most significant for the food rights advocate is that the court cited no
authority for its proposition that food choice is a right. 2 95 In 1882, in Mis-
souri, the right to food choice was so natural that the Court of Appeals did
not need to look in any law book to determine whether it was a right or not.
search for the Formulation of Federal Guidelines, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 355, 355
(1979)).
291. Richenberg v. Perry, 909 F.Supp. 1303, 1310 (D. Neb. 1995).
292. Id (noting that a prohibition on plaintiff stating that he is a homosexual "may
result in a denial of self-identity").
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In the Show-Me state, the Court of Appeals did not need to be shown. The
right to food choice is no less natural and obvious for us today.
The most eloquent account of the American's right to choice in food
came from Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field in his dissenting opinion
in Powell v. Pennsylvania, another oleomargarine case.2 96 The majority
had upheld the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute banning the sale
of certain types of imitation dairy products, and Field dissented. 2 9 7 He ar-
gued that the right to one's choice of food was part of the liberty right
guaranteed by the Constitution.29 8 He began bluntly, "I have always sup-
posed that the gift of life was accompanied with the right to seek and pro-
duce food, by which life can be preserved and enjoyed, in all ways not en-
croaching upon the equal rights of others." 2 99 He even connected the
pursuit of happiness with food rights in stating that:
[t]he right to procure healthy and nutritious food, by which
life may be preserved and enjoyed, and to manufacture it,
is among these inalienable rights, which, in my judgment,
no state can give, and no state can take away, except in
punishment for crime. It is involved in the right to pursue
one's happiness.300
But this was no mere dissenting rant; Field fit food rights into a mag-
isterial portrayal of liberty that is the law today. For Field, liberty meant
the freedom "to follow such pursuits as may be best adapted to his facul-
ties, and which will give to him the highest enjoyment." 301 Field's interpre-
tation thus differed only insubstantially from the Supreme Court's 1954
version, in which "[1]iberty under law extends to the full range of conduct
which the individual is free to pursue."302 And the full range of conduct
that the locavore wishes to pursue includes purchasing her meat and poultry
from the farmer of her choice, without governmental interference.
Finally, two more recent cases briefly touched on food's signifi-
cance and meaning. In 1973, the North Carolina Supreme Court weighed a
workers' compensation claim with a most unfortunate set of facts involving
food.303 An employee had been on a business trip and met a friend for din-
296. See generally Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
297. Id. at 690 (Field, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 698.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 692.
301. Id.
302. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
303. Bartlett v. Duke Univ., 200 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. 1973).
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ner at a restaurant, where he accidentally choked to death on his food.3 0 4
The court, in justifying its ruling that the employee's death did not arise out
of his employment, noted that "eating is not peculiar to traveling; it is a
necessary part of daily living, and one's manner of eating, as well as his
choice of food, is a highly personal matter." 305 This statement was not dic-
ta; it was an integral part of the framework for the court's opinion that eat-
ing was not related, at least in this instance, to one's employment.
Most recently, the Washington Supreme Court, in answering a certi-
fied question regarding emotional distress damages in a contaminated food
tort case, noted, "[c]ommon sense tells us that food consumption is a per-
sonal matter." 306 This aphorism succinctly illustrated the court's belief that
every person has different and independent views on food and that every
person must be allowed the freedom to react differently to food related is-
sues.
VII. CONCLUSION: FOOD CHOICE, As NARROWLY DEFINED, Is A
LIBERTY RIGHT DEEPLY ROOTED IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND TRADITION
If liberty is the freedom to make one's own choices in life, why can
we not make those choices with respect to our food? This dilemma was
foremost in food lawyer Peter Hutt's mind when he wrote, "the constitu-
tional authority of the government to determine the food that can lawfully
be marketed, and the constitutional right of the individual to personal free-
dom and control over his own destiny, will at some junctures inevitably
conflict."3 07 The day of this conflict has now arrived.
A court hearing a food right claim must accept that the Bill of
Rights is not the final word on our liberty rights,30 8 and that even Glucks-
berg conceded that our constitutional liberty rights have never been "fully
clarified."3 09 The courts must acknowledge that the right to purchase cer-
tain types of food free from governmental interference can be carefully de-
scribed and that the American custom and practice of buying meat and
poultry directly from the farmer is deeply rooted in American history and
tradition. That leaves the advocate with trying to prove that this custom
and practice is indeed a liberty right, which can be shown with the follow-
ing syllogism: the Supreme Court has placed such rights as self-identity
and self-expression squarely within liberty's domain; social science em-
304. Id. at 195.
305. Id. at 234.
306. Bylsma v. Burger King Corp., 293 P.3d 1168, 1171 (en banc) (Wash. 2013).
307. Hutt, supra note 238, at 513.
308. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992).
309. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
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braces food choice as part of self-identity; the courts, from the Supreme
Court on down, accept social scientists' opinions; thus, the courts should
logically accept food choice as part of liberty. If only it were that easy.3t o
Food choice is not a new right; it is a right and a practice as old as
civilization. It allows us to "define [our] own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." 3 11 As one so-
ciologist put it, governmental limitation on one's right "to choose what
goes into her body represents a violation of one's authenticity and author-
ship in life that limits greatly that person's ability to live according to her
conception of the good life." 312 However, it was not until industrialization
and regulation that citizens felt the need to assert such a right, and now
courts and legislators will increasingly have to take this right into account.
But, to the extent that the right to food choice might be considered a
new right, it can be analogized to John Adams' famous May 12, 1780, let-
ter to his wife Abigail, where he lamented and prophesied, "I must study
Politicks and War that my sons may have liberty to study Mathematicks
and Philosophy. My sons ought to study Geography, natural History, Na-
val Architecture, navigation, Commerce and Agriculture, in order to give
their Children a right to study Painting, Poetry, Musick, Architecture, Stat-
uary, Tapestry and Porcelaine."313 Perhaps the search for food, too, can be
compared to the passage of the generations. First, our distant ancestors
hoped to find food - any food; second, our forefathers sought food that
would allow them to thrive physically; and third, locavores and alternative
food movement advocates now seek the liberty to consume food that allows
them to thrive mentally and live their version of the good life.
310. Chemerinsky, supra note 45, at 1521-22 (stating that "I think that when you read
Bowers v. Hardwick and Washington v. Glucksberg together, it becomes extremely dif-
ficult for plaintiffs to persuade courts to recognize any additional unenumerated rights,
given the importance of the interests involved in those cases and the fact that they were
not recognized"); see also Minnesota v. Wright, 588 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Minn. Ct. App.
1998) (noting that "[t]he right to sell or peddle farm products is not a fundamental lib-
erty").
311. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
312. Pascalev, supra note 284, at 588.
313. JoHN FERLING, JOHN ADAMS: A LIFE 174-75 (1992).
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